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The paper aimed at isolating the direct productivity of economic infrastructure using a pro-
duction function approach. Based on an extension of endogenous growth theory with public
￿nance, infrastructure could have either a negative or positive e⁄ect on economic growth. The
empirical analysis utilises a panel of 19 countries from Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). With SSA
infrastructure being less developed both in terms of quantity and quality, the a priori expec-
tation was that all types of infrastructure have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on aggregate
income level. It is found that, like static estimation techniques, dynamic panel data (DPD) es-
timation techniques could also produce counterintuitive results if endogeneity of infrastructure
is not accounted for. Positive and signi￿cant direct productive e⁄ects of infrastructure (total
roads, electricity generation capacity, and telephones) were obtained using the Pooled Mean
Group (PMG) estimator (a form of DPD analysis) after instrumentation for infrastructure.
Representing infrastructure with an index constructed from the three infrastructure types also
produced similar results. The results are con￿rmed with the use of the System General Method
of Moments (SYS GMM) which constructs instruments for infrastructure using appropriate lags
of the variables in ￿rst di⁄erences and in levels. Thus, it would appear that the negative and
counterintuitive productivity results that are sometimes obtained in the literature could be
partly due to limitations in methodologies that do not appropriately account for time varying
￿xed e⁄ects and the endogeneity of infrastructure in the economic growth process, especially
for developing countries. Control variables for the macroeconomic environment and level of
political and civil rights are also found to have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on aggregate
output.
1 INTRODUCTION
The productive impact of infrastructure has long been recognised in the literature on economic
growth.1 This paper is aimed at isolating the productive impact of infrastructure through its con-
tribution to aggregate output using a sample of countries from Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Using
￿School of Economics, University of Cape Town
1Early contributions to this literature are surveyed in Gramlich (1994) and the World Bank (1994) provides a
comprehensive analysis of the economic growth e⁄ects of infrastructure. A more recent survey is provided in Romp
and de Haan (1005).
1the Database of World infrastructure stocks by Canning (1998), and the World Banks￿World De-
velopment Indicators, we estimate an empirical production function augmented with infrastructure
and a standard set of control variables that are often used in the literature.
With aggregate output dependent on inputs and their productivity, infrastructure￿ s growth
e⁄ect could be argued to arise from its use as an input to production as well as its enhancement
of the productivity of other inputs of production.2 Based on the growth model of Barro (1990),
infrastructure capital can be considered to be an input into aggregate production. This allows
for the derivation of an optimal level of infrastructure which maximizes economic growth. Hence,
the growth e⁄ect of positive shocks to infrastructure depends on whether the existing stocks are
at, below, or above their optimal level. If below their optimal level, additional infrastructure will
enhance growth, while the reverse is true if existing stocks are above the optimal level.
In attempting to explain the decline in productivity in the United States of America (USA)
in the 1970s, Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990a) used production function based approaches
to estimate output elasticities with respect to infrastructure that range from 0.30 to 0.40. Since
then, the role of infrastructure in economic activity has received increased attention. For example,
Holtz-Eakin (1994), Garcia-Mila, McGuire and Porter (1996), SÆnchez-Robles (1998), Canning
(1999), Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000), Canning and Bennathan (2000), Calder￿n and ServØn
(2004), Canning and Pedroni (2004) Fedderke and Bogetic (2006) and many others have estimated
production function or growth models that are augmented with infrastructure.
While this paper is related to these previous studies, it extends them along some dimensions.
Firstly, unlike most of the previous studies that focus on one speci￿c infrastructure sub sector, in
this paper three sub sectors, viz roads, electricity and telecommunications, are investigated. This
will allow a comparison of the impacts of the individual types of infrastructure. Secondly, this
paper also considers two alternative ways of including infrastructure in the production function.
One way is to augment the production function with individual types of infrastructure and the other
way is to use an index of infrastructure constructed from the individual types. In this way, unlike
most previous studies, this paper also addresses the issue of whether the impact of infrastructure
is dependent on whether individual types or a combination thereof is used in the analysis. Thirdly,
we also explore the possibility of whether the output e⁄ects of infrastructure are dependent on the
use of static or dynamic estimation methods. This is intended to contribute to the discussion on
the robustness of the results of many previous studies. Finally, this study uses a cross-country
time-series data set of infrastructure stocks exclusively for SSA countries. The rest of the paper is
organised as follows. The next section provides an extension of the endogenous growth literature
as a theoretical basis for analysis, and then section three brie￿ y reviews the empirical literature on
the subject. Section four focuses on the empirical methodology and estimation results, and ￿nally
section 5 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) model of growth provides a natural starting
point for discussing growth models that extend the Solow (1956) growth model with household
optimization behaviour. This model assumes a number of in￿nitely lived households that supply
labour, own capital, consume and save. In addition, ￿rms are assumed to be competitive and hire
2See Hall and Jones (1999) and Fedderke, et al (2005) for the contribution of infrastructure in enhancing the
productivity of workers.
2the services of both labour and capital to produce and sell output. These assumptions therefore
imply that the model abstracts from all market imperfections and heterogeneity of households as
well as from issues raised by inter-generational links. The dynamics of the economic aggregates
are determined by the optimizing behaviour of the economic agents (households and ￿rms) at the
microeconomic level. Eventually, this model concludes that growth is based on the accumulation
of capital and technological progress or total factor productivity.
Endogenous growth models3 as popularized by Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988), and then
by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) extended the framework of optimizing economic
agents that allows for the inclusion of a public sector variable in the production function. This public
sector variable we can interpret as economic infrastructure that is provided by the government.
Furthermore, we assume that infrastructure is not in the utility function of households. Following
this line of reasoning, we posit the following model.
2.1 Consumption
Consider a representative household (implicitly assuming homogenous households) that is in￿nitely




where is the household￿ s rate of time preference. We shall further






where ￿ > 0 and hence marginal utility has constant elasticity of ￿. The inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution in this case is 1=￿and is constant.
2.2 Production
Non-rival and non-excludable infrastructure implies that the aggregate quantity of public invest-
ment on the infrastructure is available equally to all households and ￿rms. We shall assume that
infrastructure is included in our broad capital concept and therefore may either be used directly as
an input into production or that it complements the services of other production inputs. However,
we also assume that infrastructure does not directly a⁄ect the consumption pattern of households.
Assuming Cobb Douglas production function, the representative ￿rm￿ s per capita production
function can be speci￿ed as
y = f (k;g) = ￿kag1￿a (3)
where y is per capita aggregate output, B is a technology augmenting parameter, k is per capita cap-




gi , with gi representing
a component of infrastructure services, m being the number of such services, and 0 < a < 1:Our
production function exhibits constant returns to scale and emphasizes the need for capital to grow
along with at least one type of infrastructure.
3For a wider Schumpeterian context, also see Aghion and Howitt (1992).
32.3 Public Sector
Assuming that government maintains a balanced budget and that it ￿nances its infrastructure
investment through a ￿ at tax rate ￿on total output y, the government budget constraint can be
represented as
.
￿y = g (4)
2.4 Household Optimization
Given the government￿ s determination of the tax rate and allocation of its revenue amongst gi, our
representative household will chose c to maximize equation (1) subject to the production function in
equation (3), income allocation between investment and consumption, and the government￿ s budget
constraint in equation (4). Therefore, using equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) we can formulate the








y = Bkag1￿a (6)
￿y = g (7)
￿
k = (1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ c (8)
It can be shown that the above problem leads to steady state growth of the economy that can
be represented by the following expression.
￿ =




￿ r ￿ ￿
￿
(9)
where r is a discount factor and all other variables are as de￿ned before. Given the tax rate and
the level of capital, di⁄erentiation of (9) yields:
@￿
@g
= B (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ a)
g￿a
￿k1￿a =

















This implies that the growth of the economy is concave in g and hence it could be maximised.
The condition for optimal g therefore requires the maximization of equation (9) with respect to
g subject to the government budget constraint. We can therefore impose the government budget
constraint on equation (9) so that we obtain equation (12) which we then proceed to investigate its
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Focusing on the left hand side (LHS) of (14), the ￿rst term is positive but the second term can
be positive, negative or zero. This leads to a deduction of three possible scenarios.
First, if the second term is negative, then the whole of the LHS of (14) becomes positive and













Expression (15) posits that the growth e⁄ect of public services is positive if the public good
elasticity of output is greater than one. This implies that, the growth in public services should not
exceed the growth in aggregate output if public services￿contribution to economic growth is to be
positive.
Second, if the second term on the LHS of (14) is zero, then only the ￿rst term of the LHS of (14)
remains and this is positive as indicated earlier. Therefore, the growth e⁄ect of g is still positive













Condition (16) implies that the growth e⁄ect of public services is positive but reduced to a
minimum if the public service elasticity of aggregate output is equal to one. Therefore, further
increases in the public services in this case will lead to a decreased growth e⁄ect although positive
￿diminishing growth e⁄ects.
Third, if the second term on the LHS of (14) is positive, then we have three other possibilities
depending on whether it is less than, equal to, or greater than the ￿rst term. If it is less than the
￿rst term, the growth e⁄ect of g will still be positive but less than the ￿rst two scenarios. If it is
equal to the ￿rst term, then we have equation (14) holding. This will be the point at which the
growth e⁄ect of public services are maximised. If it is greater than the ￿rst term, then the growth
e⁄ect of g is negative. The second of the three alternatives in the third scenario embodies two














5In addition, it also requires equality of both expressions on the LHS of (14). We could therefore
interpret condition (17) as the necessary condition for optimal provision of public services but it is
not su¢ cient. To derive the su¢ cient condition, we equate the two terms in question and solve for





















Since we are trying to locate the point at which the growth e⁄ect of g is zero, then we can safely
assume that at that point the output e⁄ect of g will also be maximised. In that case we can set




























Equation (19) represents the optimal tax rate, given the balanced budget assumption and opti-
mal public investment in infrastructure.
In general, this model solution implies a nonlinear relationship between aggregate output and
infrastructure.4 Below the output growth maximizing level, positive shocks to infrastructure in-
vestment will tend to increase the level of output at an increasing rate, while above the optimal
level, positive shocks could increase output but at a decreasing rate. A similar intuition is used by
Canning and Pedroni (2004) in the connection between infrastructure and growth with a similar
focus on the sign of the e⁄ect of infrastructure on aggregate output.5 Meanwhile, we brie￿ y discuss
some of the empirical literature.
3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
There have been several attempts to investigate the impact of public capital in the form of eco-
nomic infrastructure on economic growth. For example, Barro (1991) used data from 98 countries
to highlight empirical regularities in relationships between growth and other factors identi￿ed from
theory. In this study, a positive relationship between GDP growth rate and public investment was
identi￿ed, although it was not statistically signi￿cant. However, when Aschauer (1989) disaggre-
gated government expenditure and used non military capital stock time series data from the USA,
￿ core infrastructure￿ 6 which accounted for 55% of total non military capital, was found to be highly
signi￿cant in explaining productivity improvement and hence economic growth.
This ￿nding by Aschauer, triggered intense research on this area with econometric studies carried
out by for example Aschauer (1990), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Munnell (1990a, 1990b, 1992), Kessides
4The ￿ g￿in our model can be interpreted as public expenditure, infrastructure stocks or macroeconomic policy or
institutional factors depending on the speci￿cs that one needs to be referred to for clari￿cation.
5While this approach is simple, it does not account for the net e⁄ect on individual countries. Another limitation
of this approach in this paper is on its focus on the quantity of infrastructure, not accounting for quality
6Core infrastructure in this study was de￿ned to comprising of highways, mass transit, airports, electrical and gas
facilities, water and sewers.
6(1993) and Fernald (1993). These early studies attracted econometric and other methodological
criticisms from other studies such as Aaron (1990), Hulten and Schwab (1991), Rubin (1991), and
Tatom (1991). Gramlich (1994) reviewed some of these early contributions and rightly concluded
that there are mixed results.7 Moreover, this review also found that the disaggregated time series
studies provided more insight than aggregated needs assessments and macro time series studies in
terms of the type of infrastructure and whether they are optimally provided or not. The inference
drawn is that authorities should be made to determine their optimal levels of types of infrastructure.
In general, the World Bank (1994) recognised the role of infrastructure in development and empha-
sised that policy can and should be used to improve both the quantity and quality of infrastructure
services in developing countries.
As the debate continues, the focus has been on questions of how to identify a shortage of in-
frastructure investment, whether there was a shortage, and whether the shortage had an adverse
e⁄ect on productivity and hence its decline in industrialised countries. Models used in the in-
vestigations included regional production functions, cost functions of manufacturing ￿rms, as well
as sectoral or national labour productivity models. For example, recently, Destefanis and Sena
(2005), investigated the relationship between infrastructure and factor productivity in the 20 Ital-
ian regions, accounting for human capital accumulation. The study used panel data analysis and
con￿rmed that public capital (especially core infrastructure de￿ned as roads, airports, harbours,
railroads, water, electricity, and telecommunications) signi￿cantly impacts on factor productivity,
especially in the southern regions. Similarly, Brox and Fader (2005), Paul, Sahni, and Biswal
(2004), and Paul (2003), all concluded that in terms of both cost-saving and output-augmenting
measures, public infrastructure is found to have a positive and signi￿cant impact on productivity
in the private sector. In addition, public capital is found to be a substitute for both private capital
and labour, and that the rates of return to public capital are signi￿cant although they vary over the
sample period. Other evidence on the positive contributions of infrastructure to economic growth
are also provided by Canning and Pedroni (2004), Calderon and Serven (2004), and Paul (2003).
Makin and Paul (2003), provides an overview of the literature on the productive e⁄ects of
public infrastructure. They concluded that early aggregate studies based on restrictive functional
forms of production functions provide controversial estimates of public infrastructure impact on
productivity and growth. Recent studies based on ￿ exible forms of cost and pro￿t functions that
use disaggregated data ￿nd that public capital signi￿cantly contributes to productivity growth and
with high rates of return. Moreover, most economies are found to have less than optimal levels of
public capital implying a need for further investment in public infrastructure.8
African studies in this area include, Akinbobola and Saibu (2004) who used a vector autore-
gressive approach to analyse the trend of public investment in relation to human development and
unemployment. They found that an increase in the growth of public capital expenditure is asso-
ciated with a decrease in unemployment and an improvement in the human development index.9
7For example while Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990a) reported a positive e⁄ect of non-military public capital
on growth, Holtz-Eakin (1994) reported no role for public capital in growth and this is later supported by Garcia-Mila,
et al (1996).
8Other global evidence on the productivity of infrastructure include Stephan (2003), Fernandez and Montuenga-
Gomez (2003), Salinas Jimenez (2003), Kalyvitis (2003), Ramirez (2002), Rovolis and Spence (2002), Ghafoor and
Yorucu (2002), Frutos, Gracia-Diez, Perez-Amaral (1998), Sanchez-Robles (1998), Miller and Tsoukis (2001), Seung
and Kraybill (2001), Nourzad (2000), Ramirez (2000), Pereira and Sagales (1999), Delorme, Thompson and Warren
(1999), Hurlin (1999), Lachler and Aschauer (1998), Prud￿ humme (1996), Hakfoort (1996), Fernald (1999), Fedderke
and Bogetic (2006). A recent review of the literature is also provided by Romp and de Han (2005).
9It is important to note here that the same e⁄ect on employment and human development could also be obtained
from public works programmes that are mainly focused on providing employment to unskilled workers. Therefore,
7Similarly, Badawi (2003) used a co-integrated vector autoregressive model to conclude that both
private and public capital investment are found to have stimulated economic growth in Sudan for
the period 1970-1998. Furthermore, private capital is found to have a more pronounced e⁄ect on
growth than public capital possibly because the crowding out e⁄ect of public capital weakens the
positive e⁄ects it has on growth.
In another African investigation, Ayogu (1999, 2000) used regional panel data from Nigeria to
estimate regional production functions. He concludes that the evidence show a strong association
between infrastructure and output. A similar conclusion was also reached by the African Devel-
opment Bank with the addition ￿that investment in infrastructure has a very high return￿ and
therefore attractive (ADB 1999: 99).10
More recently, Fedderke, et al (2005) used a VECM model to investigate the long run growth
e⁄ects of public infrastructure in South Africa. They found that investment in infrastructure
positively contributes to growth in the country both directly and indirectly through enhancing the
productivity of private capital. A similar conclusion was also reached by Bogetic and Fedderke
(2006) although with the quali￿cation that infrastructure has a more limited impact on factor
productivity. Furthermore, in an analysis of urban dynamics in Cote d￿ Ivoire, Bogetic and Sanogo
(2005:26) found that poor infrastructure (as in a poor network of roads) constrains productivity in
both primary and tertiary industries. This is could be due to the implied limitations involved in
the transportation of goods from rural to urban areas.
The foregoing empirical evidence of both positive and negative impact of infrastructure variables
points to our theoretical conclusion in section two that there are optimal levels of public capital
provision. Below this level, public investment can positively contribute to growth, but beyond
which the contribution to growth decreases and eventually becomes negative. Regardless of this,
a limitation in comparing previous studies is that they di⁄er in many dimensions such as di⁄erent
country samples, cross country as against single country framework, and also di⁄erences in time
periods for estimation. Moreover, while some uses aggregate per capita output as their outcome
measure, others use economic growth rates, and others use total factor productivity. Similarly,
various studies use di⁄erent measures of infrastructure. These di⁄erences imply that it is di¢ cult
to assess and/or compare their results directly.
Additionally, it could also be argued that the methodology used in these studies may have
contributed to the di⁄erences in their ￿ndings. For example, it has been revealed by the empirical
literature that there has been a bias towards static cross section or panel data analysis, as well as
periodic averaging and aggregation of data in panels. This paper will attempt to address these issues
identi￿ed above through focusing explicitly on infrastructure stocks both individually measured and
as an index in the form of a factor. We then compare the sign and signi￿cance of the infrastructure
types as well as their factor using di⁄erent methods of dynamic panel data models as detailed in
the following section.
the ￿ndings of the study referred to above should be read and interpreted with caution.
10Other African evidence is provided by Reinikka and Svensson (1999), who used unique microeconomic evidence
to show the e⁄ects of poor infrastructure services on private investment in Uganda. They found that poor public
capital, proxied by an unreliable and inadequate power supply, signi￿cantly reduces productive private investment.
Similarly, Weiss, (1998) as referred to in ADB (1999), is indicated to have used a growth accounting approach with
data from 31 developing countries to demonstrate that infrastructure is positively related to output growth with the
coe¢ cients of the lagged values of the two proxies used for infrastructure being both positive and signi￿cant.
84 METHODOLOGY AND ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Accounting for the limitations identi￿ed above, the model speci￿cation for this section will con-
centrate on allowing for dynamic e⁄ects and non linearities that may be present in the association
between aggregate output and infrastructure. An aggregate production function is augmented with
both infrastructure and control variables. The control variables are the standard ones used in the
literature and they enable us to test their respective signi￿cance in our context.11
Fedderke, et al (2005a) demonstrate that in order to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates in
the presence of dynamic ￿xed e⁄ects and country speci￿c e⁄ects, Pooled Mean Group Estimators
(PMGE) can be used.12 This is a dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation method that accounts
for heterogeneity across countries included in the panel and also the possibilities of non linearities
between some or all types of infrastructure and output. Accordingly, we can specify the following
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where yit is a scalar dependent variable, xit is a k x 1 vector of weakly exogenous variables for





, and assume ￿i < 0;8i. Therefore, there exist a long
run relationship between yit and xit of the form;
yit = ￿
0
ixit + ￿it;i = 1;2;:::;N;t = 1;2:::;T (21)
where ￿i = ￿
0
i=￿i is a k x 1 vector of long run coe¢ cients, and ￿it
0s stationary with possibly
non-zero means (including ￿xed e⁄ects). Therefore, we can rewrite (4.1) as;








￿￿xi;t￿j + ￿i + "it (22)
where ￿i;t￿1 is the error correction term from (4.1) and therefore ￿ is the error correction coe¢ cient
that measures the speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium.
From this general formulation, the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator by Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (1999) allows the intercepts, short run coe¢ cients and error variances to di⁄er across groups.
However, the long-run coe¢ cients are assumed to be homogeneous. Hence ￿i = ￿;8i: This common
long-run coe¢ cient and the group speci￿c short-run coe¢ cients are computed by pooled maximum
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The e¢ ciency gains of this estimator over the Mean Group (MG) estimator proposed by Pe-
saran and Smith (1995), which allows for heterogeneity of all parameters, is based on the PMGE
11Loayza et al (2003) provides a detailed exposition on the theoretical e⁄ects of these variables and their inclusion
in growth regressions.
12Random E⁄ects estimation also accounts for such e⁄ects to some extent, but is less e¢ cient and also implies
strong exogeneity assumptions.
9assumption of long-run homogeneity of parameters. In addition, the heterogeneity of short-run
parameters is retained. A Hausman test (h ￿test) statistic is used to test the di⁄erence between
the MG and PMG long-run parameters. On the basis of this test, it is safe to assume long-run
homogeneity and hence only results for the PMG estimator are reported. This ability of explicitly
modelling the short-run dynamics and also recognising a long-run ￿ steady state￿relationship is an
important attribute for the use of this estimator in economic growth analysis where such dynamics
are inherent.
Despite the PMG estimator￿ s e¢ ciency in the presence of homogeneity and consistency in the
presence of heterogeneity, it is not a systems approach. This implies that it does not account
for the possible endogeneity of some of the variables in the system. To account for this possibility
requires the use of suitable instruments. The next sub section discusses the instrumentation process
employed.
4.1 Variables and Data
The variables used in this paper are brie￿ y described in this section.
4.1.1 Output and Capital Variables
GDPPC ￿Real GDP per capita from World development Indicators 2006. This is the variable used
for the dependent variable to represent aggregate income per capita.
KPW ￿Physical Capital Stock per worker. Physical Capital stock was computed with the per-
petual inventory method using investment series from the Pen World Tables 6.1.13 The labour force
used in the ￿nal computation was obtained from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators.
On the depreciation rate, while Nheru and Dhareshwar (1993) used 4%, Ndulu and O,Connell
(2003) used 5% in a ￿Revised Collins/Bosworth Growth Accounting Decomposition￿for African
Countries. This paper uses a depreciation rate of 6% as in Hall and Jones (1999). This higher
depreciation rate is used because SSA is renowned for inadequate maintenance on ￿xed assets and
this is known to reduce their productive life spans.14 As one of the endogenous variables of the
aggregate production function, this variable is expected to have a positive relationship with per
capita GDP.
EDU ￿Average years of schooling for population aged 15 years and over. The data for this
variable is obtained from Barro and Lee (2001). This variable is used as a measure of human capital
and hence expected to have a positive association with aggregate income.
13The initial value of the capital stock is computed with the mostly used Harberger (1978) methodology which
was also used by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and many others. It starts with assuming a long run with the
observation that if the capital output ratio is constant over a given period, then the rate of growth of capital over
this period is equal to the rate of growth of output. This implies that (Kt ￿ Kt￿1)=Kt￿1 = g, where g is output
growth rate. Assuming capital to accumulate as in Kt = (1 ￿ d)Kt￿1 +I, where d is capital￿ s depreciation rate and
I is investment, then we can derive (Kt ￿ Kt￿1)=Kt￿1 = ￿D + It=Kt￿1 from which we have Kt￿1 = It=(g + d) .
For the growth rate of output the average of the ￿rst three years corresponding to the average of the ￿rst three years
of the investment series are used. As suggested by Harberger, this averaging will account for short runvariations in
output growth and investment. The average also implies that the result is centred on the mid, hence the capital
accumulation formula is applied backwards to obtain the initial capital value.
14Bu (2004) used ￿rm level data from World Bank surveys to estimate depreciation rates of ￿xed assets of man-
ufacturing industries from six developing countries and found that they are higher than those commonly used for
industrial countries.
104.1.2 Economic Infrastructure indicators
The following types of economic infrastructure are used individually and also in combination to
compute an infrastructure index.
TRDS ￿Total roads in kilometres per 1000 of the population. Total roads in kilometres obtained
from World Bank database constructed by Canning (1998).
ELE ￿Electricity generation capacity in kilowatts per 1000 of the population also obtained from
World Bank database constructed by Canning (1998).
TELS ￿Number of ￿xed line and mobile telephone subscribers per 1000 of the population from
World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators online.
4.1.3 Policy and Institutional indicators
The macroeconomic policy indicators of ￿nancial development, openness, in￿ ation and the foreign
exchange black market premium are used to construct the ￿Macro￿policy index.
FIN ￿Money and quasi money (M2) as a ratio of GDP as an indicated of ￿nancial deepening
with data obtained from WDI. This variable is one of the controls for country speci￿c productivity
motivations. It is also included with the rational that ￿nancial deepening facilitates better resource
allocation in the economy and hence productivity encouraged (Levine, 2003; Collier and Gunning,
1999; Easterly et al, 1993; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hausmann et al,
2005). This variable is therefore expected to be positively related to per capita GDP.
OPEN ￿Imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. This is an openness variable that is
included with the rational that the more open an economy is the more competitive it becomes
and hence the more productivity is rewarded (Sachs et al, 1995; Sachs an Warner, 1997; Burnside
and Dollar, 2000; Beck et al, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2001, 2003; Bosworth and Collins, 2003;
Fedderke and Bogetic, 2006).15 In this study, this variable also controls for the external technological
e⁄ects on productivity. A positive relationship is expected between openness and aggregate national
income. Data for this variable is obtained from WDI online.
INFL ￿Following Fischer (1993), in￿ ation can be regarded as a measure of domestic ￿scal and
monetary policy prudence. As an indicator of the domestic macroeconomic policy environment,
lower and less volatile in￿ ation is usually preferred. In￿ ation is therefore expected to be negatively
related with output (Beck et al, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2001, 2003; Ismihan et al, 2002; Sirima-
neetham and Temple, 2006). This variable represents country speci￿c ￿scal and monetary policy
interactions. Data is obtained from World Economic Outlook online
BMP ￿Parallel foreign exchange market premium as an indicator of domestic management of
the external sector, obtained from Easterly￿ s lost Decades ...(2001) macro time series dataset. A
high premium is an indication of government intervention and mismanagement in the functioning
of the foreign exchange market (Easterly et al, 1993; Easterly and Levine, 1997, 2001, 2003; Beck
et al, 2000). The variable partly controls for country speci￿c management of external technological
productivity in￿ uences. This variable is therefore expected to be negatively related to per capita
income.
15Please note that some of these studies may have used a di⁄erent measure of openness from the one used in
this study. For example, Sachs et. al (2005) constructed openness dummy variables based on certain criteria. An
analogous treatment for ￿nancial depth and exchange rate mismanagement is also possible in the literature to the
extent that either of the two variables could be represented by indicators that are di⁄erent from the ones used in
this paper.
11RGTS (Rights) ￿This is a governance variable constructed as a simple aggregation of Freedom
House￿ s Political Rights and Civil Rights scores. Both political rights and civil liberties are scored
from 1 to 7 corresponding with best to worst in both variables. The G variable is intended to capture
the institutional functioning of property rights and its components are obtained from Freedom
House￿ s database of democracy indicators online. From our empirical model speci￿cation, this
variable is also controls for the country speci￿c productivity incentives and motivations. This
variable is therefore expected to be negatively related to GDP per capita ￿negativity in this case
indicating that good governance in the form of enforcement and maintenance of political rights
and civil liberties (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Hausmann et al, 2005;
Fedderke et al, 2005) is good for higher income levels.
4.2 Non Parametric Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis that follows employs aggregate annual data for a balanced panel of 19 Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries that spans the period 1980 to 1995 inclusive. This gives a total
of 304 observations for each variable in the panel. The choice of the study period is based on the
availability of data. Similarly, the countries in the panel are determined by the availability of data
and the desire to construct a balanced panel. Consequently, the countries in the panel are; Benin,
Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, The Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa is not included in the panel because of it￿ s over whelming
economic might as compared to all the other countries in SSA. For example, South Africa￿ s GDP
is more than the combined GDP of all the other countries in SSA. This makes this country very
unique and therefore an outlier if included in the sample. The empirical analysis begins with a
description of our data using the variables of interest for the study.
4.2.1 Descriptive Analysis of Key Variables in Panel
This section will mainly focus on the dependent variable and infrastructure variables so as to
get an understanding of the behaviour and characteristics of the data. Thus we shall ￿rst look
at the summary statistics and then proceed to look at the pair wise correlations between the
dependent variable and the infrastructure variables. Table 1 contains the summary statistics of
the infrastructure variables together with the dependent variable GDPPC for the panel as a whole.
Amongst the infrastructure variables, table 1 shows that electricity generating capacity, in the
bottom row of the table exhibits the largest variation with a standard deviation of 1.257 and a
range of between 12.706 and 7.791 logarithmic units.
This wide variation in electricity generating capacity could be attributed to the fact that on one
hand some countries in the panel having excess capacity as compared to domestic demand. On the
other hand, some countries in the panel have domestic capacity that is not enough to cater for the
domestic market and hence they use imported electricity to supplement the domestic capacity. For
example, in Southern Africa, Zambia exports electricity, in West Africa, Ghana exports electricity,
in East Africa, Uganda exports electricity, and in Central Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo
exports electricity. All these electricity exporting countries as well as some of the countries importing
this electricity are part of the panel of countries used in this study, hence the possibility for wide
variation in the respective electricity generating per capita capacities.
On the contrary, table 1 also shows that the logarithm of per capita roads has the least variation
of the infrastructure variables, with a standard deviation of 0.553 and a range between 9.352 and
127.036. This relatively small variation in roads is similarly exhibited by per capita GDP with a
standard deviation of 0.526 and a range of between 8.969 and 6.187 logarithmic points. We proceed
with correlation analysis before any preliminary remarks on the association of the variables could
be made.
TABLE 1 HERE
4.2.2 Correlations Between Real GDP per capita and Infrastructure
Using all observations in the panel, table 2 below shows that the correlation coe¢ cients between
real GDP per capita and all the infrastructure variables are positive and signi￿cant at the 5%
level. Accordingly to the magnitudes of the correlation coe¢ cients, telephones are the most highly
correlated with real GDP with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.60. This is followed by electricity
generating capacity with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.56. This is an indication of an association
between the infrastructure variables used in this study and real GDP per capita. Additionally,
the infrastructure variables are also signi￿cantly correlated with each other. Per capita electricity
generating capacity has signi￿cant correlation coe¢ cients of 0.42 and 0.65 with per capita roads
and per capita telephones respectively.
TABLE 2 HERE
These signi￿cant correlations between the infrastructure variables points to the possibility of
multicollinearity in a regression in which all the infrastructure variables are simultaneously included
as explanatory variables. Instead, the high correlation between the infrastructure variables could be
used to justify the use of one of these variables as a representative variable for all the infrastructure
variables. The other possibility, which is pursued in this paper, is that the high correlation between
the infrastructure variables allows the construction of a composite infrastructure variable or index.
The analysis therefore proceeds with a two prong strategy. Firstly, the infrastructure variables
will be considered individually and secondly, an infrastructure index that could be interpreted as a
composite infrastructure good is constructed and separately treated as an additional infrastructure
variable.
The infrastructure index is constructed using principal component factor analysis which produces
the following index;
FAINF = 0:314lntrds + 0:440lntels + 0:508lnegc:
This infrastructure index is found to have a pair wise correlation of 0.65 with the logarithm of
real GDP per capita and it is signi￿cant at the 5% level. Therefore, in the section for estimation,
the infrastructure index will be considered separately in addition to the individual infrastructure
types which also enter the regressions in succession. But ￿rst we consider the correlation between
our policy variables.
4.2.3 Macroeconomic Environment Control Variables
In the interest of parsimony, we follow the approach of Burnside and Dollar (2000) so that four of
the control variables for macroeconomic policy (Trade, M2, In￿ ation and Black Market Premium)
are used to construct an index that is referred to as Macro. These variables are all found to be
signi￿cantly correlated with each other, hence the use of the index. Table 3 provides the correlation
matrix of the variables.
TABLE 3 HERE
13While this index is intended to capture the overall quality of macroeconomic policy environment,
constructing such an index also reduces measurement error associated with using one indicator as
a proxy for policy.16 Principal component factor analysis is used to construct the index as follows.
Macro = 0:377lnm2 + 0:371lntrade ￿ 0:298lninfl ￿ 0:325lnbmp
The macro index is found to have a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.36 with real GDP per capita and
it is signi￿cant at the 5% level. By construction, larger values of the index imply good policy and
hence a positive coe¢ cient is expected for this variable in our regressions.
On a similar note, the freedom house￿ s political rights and civil liberties are also found to
be signi￿cantly correlated with each other with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.88. Hence the two
variables are aggregated into a single variable denoted as rights (rgts).17 The construction of this
variable is such that lower values are an indication of better political rights and civil liberties. This
variable is included as a proxy for the institutions dealing with the protection of property rights.
Therefore, this variable is expected to have a negative coe¢ cient if indeed property rights do play a
positive contribution to growth in aggregate output. The rights variable is found to have a negative
correlation coe¢ cient of 0.44 with real GDP per capita and this is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
4.3 Parametric Estimation Results and Analysis
For ease of comparison, table 4 presents the long run dynamic estimates of PMGE before and after
instrumentation. Columns A1 through A4 report the estimates and model diagnostic statistics
without instruments, while columns B1 through B4 reports similar information after instrumenta-
tion. Using and ARDL model as in equation (22) above, this estimator used the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) to select the lag orders. The PMGE is preferred to the static estimators in the
sense that this estimator has superior e¢ ciency characteristics in the presence of homogeneity across
groups and superior consistency properties in the presence of heterogeneity across groups. The es-
timates reported in Columns A1 through A4 of table 4 did not produce any statistically signi￿cant
infrastructure variables. In addition, the signs of all the infrastructure variables are negative. This
is counter intuitive for African countries and could be the result of endogeneity of infrastructure in
our model. We therefore focus on interpreting results reported in columns B1 through B4 of table
4. Before this is done, we ￿rst present the process through which instruments are constructed for
the infrastructure variables.
4.3.1 Instrumentation for Infrastructure
Following an approach pioneered by Fedderke and Bogetic (2006), instruments for stocks of in-
frastructure could be derived from constructing a demand for infrastructure function. Canning
(1999), in a study of infrastructure￿ s contribution to aggregate output using a world wide dataset
of countries, indicated that the demand for infrastructure is driven by population density and ur-
banisation. This view is also held in Bogetic and Sanogo (2005) in trying to explain the pattern of
urbanisation in the Cote d￿ Ivoire.
16Indices also limits the in￿uences of outlier observations and also helps in overcoming the di¢ culty of identifying
separate e⁄ects of ￿scal prudence, in￿ation control and exchange rate management in relatively small data sets when
variables are highly correlated.
17The two variables are with values that range from 1 (indicating best) to 7 (indicating worst). Therefore, the
aggregated rights variable ranges from 2 (best rights) to 14 (worst rights).
14Following Fay (2001) as well as Fay and Yepes (2003), both on infrastructure demand in Latin
American countries, the demand for infrastructure per capita could be estimated in a reduced form













Where I is infrastructure, P is population, Y is aggregate income,
qI
w is the price of infrastructure,
and Yag and Yman are the share of GDP from agriculture and manufacturing respectively, and
A is for technology.18 Roller and Wavermen (2001) used a similar formulation of the demand for
telecommunications infrastructure in a simultaneous equation panel study with data from 21 OECD
countries over a period of 20 years to determine the impact of infrastructure on economic growth.








Where TEL is the demand for telecommunications infrastructure and this is modelled to be a
function of per capita GDP (GDP/POP) and the price of telephone services (TELP).19 Intuitively,
these studies on infrastructure demand used the basic micro economic foundation on demand for
a good being dependent ob the price of the good , the income level of the consumers, and other
factors that a⁄ect demand. The di⁄erence is on the way the infrastructure prices are accounted for
in their respective models.20
Employing the above approach, we can construct an instrument in which the demand for in-
frastructure can be generally expressed as in the following reduced form function.
Ip = F (Yp;Pi;V Aag;V Ama;Ub;Pd;A) (25)
Where Ip is infrastructure demand per capita, Yp is income per capita, Pi is the price of infrastruc-
ture, V Aag is value added from the agricultural sector, V Ama is value added from the manufacturing
sector, Ub is urbanisation, Pd is population density, and A is technology. To overcome the prob-
lems of getting appropriate variables for infrastructure prices and country speci￿c technology, we
follow the Fay (2001) methodology and used static country ￿xed e⁄ects estimation to control for
di⁄erences in both the prices of infrastructure and technology. Furthermore, the natural logarithm
transformation is used to linearised the model and all the regressions included year dummies and a
constant to further account for technological dependence on time. Consequently, the instruments
were constructed with the following equations.
Trdinst = 0:0246614 ￿ lnGdppc ￿ 0:0241752
￿ lnV Aag+0:0114731￿
lnV Ama￿0:6705358￿ lnPd + 0:2694915
￿ lnUb
18This formulation was used in a study to predict the existing and future infrastructure needs of the Latin America
and Caribbean region.
19In their empirical estimation, Roller and Waverman (2001) used telephone revenue from mainlines as a proxy for
prices. Fay (2001) on the other hand employed ￿xed e⁄ects estimation to jointly control for the price of infrastructure
and technology in their empirical implementation. Data limitations dictate that we follow the latter methodology to
control for infrastructure price and technology in constructing our infrastructure instruments.
20While Fay (2001) and Fay and Yepes (2003) used ￿xed e⁄ects to account for country speci￿c di⁄erences in prices
and technology, Roller and Waverman (2001) used revenue from the telephones as a proxy for the price.
15Telinst = 0:196835 ￿lnGdppc ￿ 0:1959319
￿lnV Aag￿0:097322
￿lnV Ama￿0:9116022￿lnPd ￿ 0:4277121
￿lnUb
Egcinst = ￿0:1585318 ￿lnGdppc ￿ 0:2441573
￿lnV Aag+0:0177037
￿lnV Ama+0:1110549￿lnPd ￿ 0:5110642
￿lnUb
Fainfinst = 0:0363057 ￿lnGdppc ￿ 0:1984108
￿lnV Aag￿0:0290405
￿lnV Ama￿0:7359361￿lnPd ￿ 0:2412687
￿lnUb
Where inst after the left hand side (LHS) variables denotes instrument, ln in front of the right
hand side (RHS) variables denotes the natural logarithm,
Gdppc is per capita GDP at constant international dollars for income per capita, and all other
variables are as de￿ned above.21 We re-estimated our infrastructure augmented production in which
all the infrastructure variables are replaced by their respective instruments.
4.3.2 Parametric Estimation with Infrastructure Instruments
It is generally observed that using the hausman test statistic, long run homogeneity of our parameter
estimates is only valid for some regressions before and after instrumentation depending on the
signi￿cance level. In contrast, the error correction mechanism validates long run convergence,
hence the existence of movements to a long run. The log likelihood ratio supports the equality of
long run parameters. Put together, we have a situation in which the ECM points to the existence of
a long run, with parameters that tend to be equal across countries (according to the LR statistic) so
that we have long run convergence but not necessarily to homogeneous steady states. However, the
short run dynamics through which long run convergence is achieved vary between countries, hence
the signi￿cance of the ECM. It appears that while there is long run convergence of the countries,
there are di⁄erent types of steady states. This is along the lines of club convergence. More speci￿c
analyses along these lines will be made but ￿rst we take a look at the performance of our control
variables and then proceed to our variables of interest - infrastructure.
In columns B2 and B3, physical capital￿ s e⁄ect on aggregate output is positive and statistically
signi￿cant. This variable￿ s elasticity with respect to per capita output ranges from 0.242 to 0.247.
These elasticities are below those obtained by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) (MRW) as well as
those obtained in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clara (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) and more recently by
Canning and Bennathan (2000).
The corresponding coe¢ cient estimates for the human capital variable are not conclusive in the
sense that while one is positive and statistically signi￿cant (column B3), the other is with a counter
intuitive sign but also statistically signi￿cant (column B2). On the contrary, POLS produces human
capital coe¢ cient estimates that are all positive and speci￿cally statistically signi￿cant at 5% and
21The coe¢ cients of the variables used in the construction of the instruments are derived from the ￿xed e⁄ects
regressions with year dummies and a constant included. All variables are in log transformation so that the equations
are linearized.
1610% levels in columns 1a and 1b respectively (See appendix). In particular, the human capital
elasticity of output of 0.0885 in column 1b favourably compares with the 0.087 and 0.095 obtained
by Canning (1999) for the full sample and developing countries respectively. Positive and signi￿cant
contribution of both physical and human capital on aggregate output is consistent with the general
expectations from the theoretical literature on growth.
The macro economic variable is consistently positive and signi￿cant regardless of the estimation
method with an elasticity that hovers around 0.1. The exception is column B3 where macro is
neither signi￿cant nor with a coe¢ cient that is di⁄erent from zero. This underscores the importance
of a suitable macroeconomic environment as well as the complementarity of the component variables
within this index. This corresponds to the ￿ndings in King and Rebelo (1990), Fischer (1993),
Easterly (1993), Sachs, et el (1995), Sachs and Warner (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Collier and
Gunning (1999b) exclusively on Africa, Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly and Levine (2001,
2003), Ismihan et al (2002), Sirimaneetham and Temple (2006) and Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik
(2005) amongst many others that good policy in the form of prudent management of monetary and
￿scal policies to keep in￿ ation under control, ￿nancial sector liberalization, exchange rate ￿ exibility,
and trade openness are an essential part of growth orientation of an economy.
Similarly, the coe¢ cient estimates for the rights index is consistently negative regardless of the
estimation method. Recall that negativity of this coe¢ cient is expected, and implies that good
political pluralism and upholding of civil liberties make a positive contribution to growth. In
essence, these are elements of good governance which have also been shown to contribute positively
to economic growth.22
TABLE 4 HERE
All the infrastructure variables now have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on aggregate output
with elasticities of 0.46, 1.34, 0.22, and 0.38 for roads, electricity generating capacity, telephones
and the index respectively for columns B1 through B4. The elasticity of telephones with respect
to aggregate output (0.22) is comparable to the 0.24 and 0.19 obtained by Uchimura and Gao
(1993) for transport, water and communication in Taiwan and Korea respectively. In contrast, it
is comparatively higher than the 0.16 obtained by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) for transport and
communication in a multicountry study that includes developing countries, as well as the 0.139
obtained by Canning (1999)23 for telephones in low income countries, and the 0.15 reported by
Roller and Waverman (2001) for telephones using a panel of 21 OECD countries, but below the
0.41 obtained by Fedderke and Bogetic (2006) for South Africa.
The infrastructure index elasticity of 0.381 (column B4) is comparable to the 0.39 found by
Aschauer (1989) and 0.34 found by Munnell (1990a) both for non military public capital for the
United States, but higher than the 0.20 found by Mera (1973) for industrial infrastructure in regions
of Japan as well as the 0.19 and 0.24 found by Uchimura and Gao (1993) for transportation, water
and communication for Korea and Taiwan respectively.
In general, the results reported in table 2 as a whole should be interpreted with caution. In
columns A1 through A4, all the coe¢ cients estimates of the infrastructure variables are unexpect-
edly negative and signi￿cant. But, we can discount these counter intuitive results on the basis
that there are other associated inconsistencies with the long-run homogeneity assumption that pro-
22A good evaluation of the governance and growth experiences in SSA is provided in Ndulu and O￿ Connell (1999).
The protection of property rights is also widely recognised as a responsibility of the state and hence an essential
element of good governance. Kaufmann, et al (1999) and Gradstein (2005) provides in-depth analyses on the
importance of governance for economic growth.
23Canning (1999:12) reported elasticities of 0.144, 0.139 and 0.257 for full sample, lower-income countries and
higher-income countries respectively.
17duces them. Using the 5% signi￿cance level as a benchmark, the h-test statistic is signi￿cant in
column A2; e⁄ectively rejecting the long-run homogeneity assumption for the electricity generating
capacity regression before instrumentation. In contrast, and again using the 5% signi￿cance level
as benchmark, the h-test statistic is not signi￿cant in all of columns B1 through B4. This lends
support to the long-run homogeneity assumption. Accounting for endogeneity of the infrastructure
variables through the use of instruments may have contributed to these observations.
This argument will not hold if a 10% level of signi￿cance is considered. In this case, the h-test
becomes signi￿cant for the roads and electricity regressions before instrumentation (columns A1
and A2) and also for electricity and telephones after instrumentation (columns B2 and B3). Thus
we have an overlap in which the electricity regressions reject the long run homogeneity assumption
both before and after the use of instruments for this infrastructure variable. This is further evidence
that there are signi￿cant variations in the electricity generation capacity of the countries used in our
sample due to the inclusion of both electricity importing and exporting countries in our panel. This
was highlighted earlier in the analysis of the descriptive data. Instrumentation therefore mainly
assisted in reversing the counter intuitive sign of the elasticity of electricity generation capacity
with respect to aggregate income. Evidently, there are very high positive returns to investment in
electricity generation as illustrated by an elasticity of 1.34 in column B2.
It can immediately be recognised that instrumentation for infrastructure does not only reverse
the counter intuitive coe¢ cients estimates signs for these variables, it also retains their statistical
signi￿cance. However, the size of the infrastructure coe¢ cients are relatively higher (with the
exception of the 0.220 in column B3 for telephones) than those of comparable studies reported
earlier.
In general error correction mechanism coe¢ cients reported in table 4 are all between zero and
minus one. This implies a rapid short-run transition adjustment to the long run. Thus, since
individual countries adjust di⁄erently to positive infrastructure shocks in the short run, they all
converge to di⁄erent steady states in the long-run. As noted earlier, the hausman test rejects the
legitimacy of the long run restrictions of the parameters for some of the regressions (depending
on the level of signi￿cance considered) and especially for the electricity regressions if the hausman
test is considered at 10%. Therefore, we should not lose sight of the existence of country speci￿c
di⁄erences because some of these peculiarities may be important determinants of these countries￿
growth paths.
The coe¢ cients estimates obtained for infrastructure variables could only allow a general remark
that accounting for the endogeneity of infrastructure in production reverses the counter intuitive
negative impact that could be obtained even when there is a well acknowledged low quantity and
quality for infrastructure stocks in existence as in SSA.
As a robustness check, we employ another dynamic panel data GMM estimation method that
similarly uses an ARDL formulation together with a systems approach. Unlike the PMGE, this
estimator uses appropriate lags of variables in levels as instruments for equations in ￿rst di⁄erences
and conversely for equations in levels, all of which are combined into a system of equations with
options to treat any of the variables in the system as endogenous or predetermined. This method
is described in detail in a related paper that uses public capital expenditure ￿gures as proxies for
public capital.24 We therefore only discuss the results of the estimation.
Table 5 present the short-run parameter estimates of SYS GMM with standard errors that are
robust to the presence of heterogeneity and contemporaneous correlation. Both the Sargan test
24Interested readers could also access a description of this method in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and
Bover (1995) with production function applications in Blundell and Bond (2000).
18for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions and the test for the presence of second order
auto correlation in the ￿rst di⁄erenced residuals lend support for the model formulation and hence
validate the system estimates for statistical inference. In the model speci￿cations, both physical
capital per worker and the infrastructure variables were treated as endogenous and therefore they
all enter the short-run model speci￿cation with a lag structure which is not necessarily uniform. In
contrast, the variables for human capital, macroeconomic policy and rights environment enter as
weakly exogenous because these are mainly control variables. Furthermore, all regressions included
year dummies and constants which have been suppressed for ease of presentation.
The short-run dynamics in table 5 implies that infrastructure investment carries possibilities of
both negative and positive e⁄ects on the economy. Additionally, either of these e⁄ects could be
signi￿cant in the short term due to possible adjustment constraints. We could also not a di⁄erence in
the lag structure of the regressions. Speci￿cally, the roads infrastructure model in column I involves
lagging both the capital labour variable and the roads variable twice before signi￿cant reasonable
results could be obtained. This implies using lags of order three and earlier as instruments for this
model. In contrast, the models for electricity generating capacity in column II and telephones in
column III were able to produce intuitive results using only one lag of the capital labour ration
and the respective infrastructure measures. Therefore, for these models, it was possible to use
instruments starting from the second lag of the respective variables.
TABLE 5 HERE
The longer lag for the roads model as compared to the other infrastructure models could be an
indication that the economy takes longer to adjust and realise the full potential of investment in
roads than with investment in telephones and electricity generating capacity. Eventually, however,
all the infrastructure parameter estimates end up with a positive net e⁄ect in the long-run, the
magnitudes of which are reported in table 6 below.
TABLE 6 HERE
The p-values of the common factor restrictions tests all validate the signi￿cance of the long-run
elasticities. This conforms to what was obtained in the PMG estimations with instrument (and
h-test evaluated at the 5% level of signi￿cance) that despite heterogeneities in the short-run, there
is a smooth adjustment into a long-run, though each country may have its own long-run.
The long-run coe¢ cient estimates for the capita labour ratio ranges from 0.04 to 0.07. Though
they are similarly positive, they are smaller in magnitude as compared to those obtained with the
PMG estimator and other studies referred to earlier. On the contrary, the human capital variable
is now consistently positive and signi￿cant with long run elasticity that ranges from 0.37 to 0.63.
This is a complete reversal from the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient that was mostly obtained
for this variable from the PMG estimator. The SYS GMM estimator has therefore performed better
than the PMG estimator in this regard. However, the magnitude of the long-run coe¢ cient is much
higher than those obtained in comparable studies.
The macroeconomic policy and rights indices continue to be consistently with the expected signs
in support of their role in economic growth. In addition, we have also seen a general increase in the
magnitude of the long-run coe¢ cient estimates for both indices.
Unlike the control variables, the long-run coe¢ cient estimates for the infrastructure variables
are now reduced in magnitude and more plausible and comparable to similar studies especially for
developing countries. There is also a noticeable pattern in the size of the long-run coe¢ cients for
the infrastructure variables. The roads infrastructure, with the longest short-run lag structure, has
the highest long-run elasticity, followed by electricity generating capacity. Intuitively, investment
projects for a percentage increase in roads will naturally involve more resources and time to complete
19as compared to a similar investment for a proportionate increase in electricity generating capacity
or the number of telephones. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a percentage increase in roads
infrastructure to have a larger multiplier e⁄ect than a percentage increase in the other two types
of infrastructure in this study.
5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
In conclusion, physical and human capital can both positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ect aggregate
output in the sample of SSA studied. Irrespective of whether we use static or dynamic estimators,
the importance of a stable and open macroeconomic policy environment for production has also
been demonstrated. With the macroeconomic environment being an interaction of several policy
dimensions, the performance of our four component policy index has also demonstrated the impor-
tance of policy in facilitating productivity, and hence the need for coordinated policy. On a similar
note, a conducive economic environment is also complemented by a governance system that ensures
the provision and protection of political and civil rights.
While infrastructure has been found to have a direct impact on aggregate output in the sample
of SSA countries used in this study, the isolation of this positive impact is better carried out with
individual types of infrastructure studied separately if predictions of future requirements are to
be made. Otherwise, it has also been possible to demonstrate the positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
of infrastructure on aggregate output through the use of an infrastructure index. Furthermore, it
has also been demonstrated that infrastructure needs to be treated as endogenous to the economic
production process in order to be able to identify both the direction of impact and a plausible
magnitude of the impact. Therefore, adequately predicting the future demand of infrastructure
investment is better carried out in a systems approach that treats infrastructure as endogenous and
hence part of the economic system.
It is further noted that the estimated long run elasticities of infrastructure with respective to
aggregate output are relatively higher than those obtained in similar studies for developed countries
but comparable to those for studies involving developing countries. This could be interpreted as
a re￿ ection of the relatively higher returns for infrastructure investment in the sample of SSA
countries used in this study because some of these countries are comparatively worse o⁄ both in
terms of quantity and quality of existing infrastructure.
Furthermore, it is also important to note that SSA countries in the panel used for this study
are found to be heterogenous and hence there is a need to always control for this in panel studies or
regional programmes. Therefore, despite there is a general shortage of infrastructure in these coun-
tries, attempts to remedy the situation should not be generic but targeted to respective individual
countries. This is very important in forecasting future demand of infrastructure investment. Even
a regional forecast needs to proceed with the individual country forecasts aggregated into regional.
This study has not found any evidence of over investment in the types of infrastructure consid-
ered. Instead, it has found that existing stocks of all the three types of infrastructure studied are
below their optimal level. Therefore, public investment in all these types of infrastructure could
improve the growth prospects of the countries in the sample.
With the above in mind, policy makers and public managers in SSA countries should nevertheless
be mindful of the source of funding for investment in infrastructure. It is important that scarce
resources are not diverted from maintenance of existing infrastructure stocks. Several options are
suggested in the literature as detailed in Kessides (2004). Social planners and managers should
20ensure that new infrastructure adds to the existing stock instead of replacing the old stock due to
lack of appropriate maintenance.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
____________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Obs  Mean   Std.  Dev.  Min     Max   
      
Lngdppc 304  7.156123 .5259426 6.187      8.969   
lntrds    304  7.976344 .5529728 7.036      9.352   
lntels    304  1.208047 1.002062 -.472      4.960   
lnegc    304  10.24355 1.257206 7.791      12.706   
____________________________________________________________ 




Table.2: Pair Wise Correlations between Real GDP per capita and per capita 
Infrastructure Variables. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
    lngdppc     lntrds     lntels      lnegc 
_________________________________________________________________  
lngdppc 1.00   
  
lntrds    0.32*     1.00  
    
lntels    0.60*     0.10       1.00  
    
lnegc    0.56*     0.42*     0.65*     1.00  
__________________________________________________________________ 





Table 3: Pair Wise Correlations Between Macroeconomic Policy Variables 
  lnm2   lntrade   lninfl   lnbmp 
     
lnm2   1.00   
  
lntrade   0.55*   1.00   
  
lninfl   -0.41*   -0.20*   1.0000   
   
lnbmp   -0.28*   -0.44*   0.31*   1.0000   
Note: A * denotes significance at the 5% level.  Inflation (infl) and Black market premium (bmp) enter 










  A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 








LnKpw  0.335**   
(0.045)   
[7.502] 
0.288**   
(0.045)   
[6.430] 
0.230**   
(0.043)   
[5.297] 
0.352**   
(0.035)   
[9.945] 
0.250**   
(0.058)   
[4.322] 
0.242**   
(0.047)   
[5.138] 
0.247**   
(0.057)   
[4.332] 
0.095**   
(0.038)   
[2.519] 
LnEdu  -0.050   
(0.047)   
[-1.067] 
-0.168**   
(0.037)   
[-4.585] 
-0.043   
(0.040)   
[-1.096] 
-0.117**   
(0.038)   
[-3.062] 
-0.112*  
(0.058)   
[-1.931] 
-0.369**   
(0.080)  
 [-4.595] 
0.116**   
(0.043)   
[2.700] 
-0.306**   
(0.086)   
[-3.538]     
LnTrds  -0.132*   
(0.070)  
 [-1.873] 
    0.462**   
(0.147)   
[3.139] 
   
LnEgc   -0.059**   
(0.028)  
 [-2.096] 
   1.337**   
(0.205)   
[6.515] 
  
LnTels     -0.140**   
(0.022)  
 [-6.346] 
   0.220**   
(0.052)   
[4.239] 
 
Fainf       -0.209**   
(0.034)  
 [-6.131] 
   0.381**   
(0.075)   
[5.050] 
Macro  0.112**   
(0.008)  
[14.701] 
0.101**   
(0.011)   
[8.841] 
0.087**   
(0.007)  
[12.728] 
0.090**   
(0.007)  
[12.806] 
0.125**   
(0.010)  
[11.929] 
0.067**   
(0.020)   
[3.287] 
0.131**   
(0.010)  
[13.351] 
0.096**   
(0.009)  
[11.034] 
LnRgts  0.010   
(0.017)   
[0.564] 
-0.047**   
(0.018)   
[-2.580] 
-0.049**   
(0.018)   
[-2.786] 
-0.031**   
(0.016)  
 [-1.982] 
-0.038**   
(0.019)  
 (-1.995) 
-0.086**   
(0.023)  
 [-3.734] 
0.000   
(0.018)   
[0.012] 
-0.129**   
(0.026)  
 [-4.875} 
ECM    -0.686**   
(0.093)        
[-7.387] 
-0.691**   
(0.093)        
[-7.416] 
-0.587**   
(0.092)        
[-6.361] 
-0.690**   
(0.101)        
[-6.853] 
-0.650**   
(0.091)        
[-7.165] 
-0.316**   
(0.112)        
[-2.821] 
-0.249*   
(0.129)        
[-1.931] 
-0.531**   
(0.176)        
[-3.008] 
h-test  10.80* 
{0.06} 
17.26**    
{0.00} 
6.48    
{0.26} 
8.88    
{0.11} 
4.42   
{0.49} 
10.68*    
{0.06} 
10.60*    
{0.06} 
1.39    
{0.93} 
















RLL   556.358 515.6444  573.0227  553.7331  548.5772  623.3339  625.5320  604.1122 
ULL  867. 172  863.6292  840.6746  863.6500  901.6993  989.8153  879.3136  852.2197 
Notes: PMGE denotes Pooled Mean Group Estimator and PMGE-IV implies PMGE with instruments; 
figures in round parenthesis are standard errors, those in square brackets are t-ratios, those in {} are 
associated p values of the statistics.  ECM denotes the error correction mechanism, h-test denotes the 
Hausman test statistic for the null hypothesis of long run homogeneity, LR is the likelihood ratio 
statistic testing for equal long run parameters, RLL and ULL are the restricted and unrestricted log 









 Table 5: System GMM Estimation Results. Dependent Variable LnGdppc. 
 
 I  II  III  IV 
Gdppci(t-1) 0.8684** (0.056)    
[0.00] 
0.9601** (0.015)    
[0.00] 
0.9659** (0.012)    
[0.00] 
0.9607** (0.016)    
[0.00] 
Kpwit 3.2592** (0.878)    
[0.00] 
0.4570** (0.097)    
[0.00] 
0.4098** (0.104)    
[0.00] 
0.4775** (0.111)    
[0.00] 
Kpwi(t-1) -6.0190** (1.796)  
[0.00] 
-0.4553** (0.096)  
[0.00] 
-0.4074** (0.103)   
[0.00] 
-0.4756** (0.110)   
[0.00] 
Kpwi(t-2) 2.7645** (0.929)    
[0.01] 
   
Trdsit 0.3782** (0.163)    
[0.03] 
   
Trdsi(t-1) -0.6600** (0.212)   
[0.01] 
   
Trdsi(t-2) 0.3121** (0.113)    
[0.01] 
   
Egcit   -0.0664** (0.025)   
[0.02] 
  
Egci(t-1)   0.0716** (0.026)    
[0.01] 
  
Telit     -0.0705* (0.040)    
[0.10] 
 
Teli(t-1)     0.0731* (0.043)     
[0.10] 
 
Fainf       -0.1191  ** 
(0.053)     [0.04] 
Fainf        0.1271** (0.058)    
[0.04] 
Eduit 0.0483** (0.019)    
[0.02] 
0.0185** (0.008)    
[0.02] 
0.0215** (0.008)    
[0.02] 
0.0163* (0.009)     
[0.08] 
Macroit 0.0254** (0.006)    
[0.00] 
0.0110** (0.004)    
[0.01] 
0.0110** (0.005)    
[0.03] 
0.0110** (0.004)    
[0.01] 
Rgtsit -0.0860** (0.027)   
[0.01] 
-0.0374** (0.011)   
[0.00] 
-0.0394** (0.012)   
[0.00] 














test for AR(2) in 
first differences; 
P-value 








Notes: All variables are in their logarithm transformations.  Figures in round parenthesis are standard 
errors and those in square brackets are p-values.  A ** denotes significance at the 5% level while a * 












 Table 6:  Long-run Per Capita Output Elasticities from SYS GMM Estimates. 
 
 
 C1  C2  C3  C4 








Trds 0.23   
 
   
Egc   0.13   
 
  
Tels     0.08 
 
 
Fainf     0.20 
 

















Com. fac.  
P-value 
  0.008  0.169 0.211   0.239 
Note:  Com. fac P-value is the P-value for the test of the common factor restrictions for the derivation 
of the long-run coefficients.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 